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2. Introduction 
Research on evaluating competition policy has grown rapidly in the last 10-20 
years, and this is a good time to ask: “what have we learned so far?” and 
“what are the pressing questions for future research”?  This survey1 is not so 
much about the effectiveness of competition policy per se, but more the 
methodologies used to evaluate it.  It points to the gaps or unanswered 
questions in the evaluation area, and sets an agenda of issues where we 
believe the need for future research is most pressing. 
It complements a number of other recent surveys. Some have been produced 
or commissioned by the CAs themselves, such as Davies (2010), and 
Buccirossi et al. (2006); other works include a critical overview of impact 
evaluation by Bergman (2008), and surveys of methodologies in the US by 
Werden (2008), and by Kemp and Sinderen (2008) for the Netherlands.   
2.1 The purposes of evaluation 
Evaluation is undertaken both by the Competition Authorities (CAs) and 
independent academics.  It can take many forms, not least because it is 
required for different purposes.  At the risk of over-simplification, these fall into 
four broad categories: 
Accountability  
Increasingly, there is an obligation on CAs around the world, to their 
Governments2 to quantify the aggregate benefits of competition policy 
                                            
1
  Earlier versions of some of the ideas in this paper can be found in Davies‟s keynote 
lecture, “Ex-post evaluation methodologies of competition enforcement “,presented to the 
Conference on Ex-post evaluation of competition policy, Mannheim June 4, 2009, at: 
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-
docs/veranstaltungen/evalcomp2009/Programme_Evaluation2009.pdf.  Davies‟s subsequent 
evaluation of the evaluation methods used by OFT is reported in “A Review of OFT's Impact 
Estimation Methods” (January 2010), OFT1164, at: 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-work/oft1164.pdf  This includes a 
survey of the evaluation methodologies used by CAs. 
2
  For example, in the UK, HM Treasury has set a performance target for OFT that it 
should deliver direct financial benefits to consumers of at least five times its cost to the 
taxpayer. 
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(measured perhaps by increased consumer surplus).  The aggregate estimate 
is often then assessed against some pre-specified target to judge whether the 
CA has met its required objectives.  These impact evaluations typically involve 
using some of the methodologies described below. 
Assessment of specific policies 
Sometimes, the purpose is to evaluate a specific area of policy (e.g. merger 
control), and/or of the success of a particular intervention (e.g. a prosecuted 
cartel, or prohibited merger.)  Again, this is often undertaken (or at least 
overseen) internally by the CA itself, perhaps to check on the quality of its 
own decision-making – the rigour of its analysis, data collection etc – and/or to 
help set internal priorities 
Assessment in the broader academic literature 
Policy evaluation in the academic literature appears in a multitude of guises.  
Sometimes it might be designed as an independent check on the performance 
of the CAs.  More often however, the immediate objectives of the research 
may be more academic, focusing primarily on the development/testing of 
theory and/or empirical techniques.  Nevertheless, these studies often employ 
important anti-trust cases, and have frequently led to developments in 
evaluation methodologies. 
Estimating damages and fines 
In any private damages case (or indeed when a CA sets a fine, where 
applicable), this entails an evaluation of harm, and, by implication, the gains 
resulting from the CA intervention to remove that harm.   
Depending on the purpose, and who undertakes the evaluation, the 
sophistication of the evaluation can vary considerably.  At one extreme, 
simple rules of thumb are often used in accountability exercises for obvious 
reasons of practicability; at the other extreme are highly sophisticated 
extensions/applications of theory using frontier econometric methodologies. 
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The question of who undertakes the evaluation, and how deeply, raises 
important issues of the potential distortion of incentives and priorities within 
the CA, and we return to this in section 4.2.3 below.  
2.2 Evaluation by policy areas 
We define the constituent areas of competition policy (Table 1) initially as all 
activities undertaken by enforcement agencies. While these are not all strictly 
law enforcement, the non-enforcement activities are often extremely  
resource-demanding and it would seem appropriate, at least for the CAs 
themselves, to evaluate their impact too.  
For each area of activity, the Table provides our assessment3 of the extent of 
the academic literature and CAs‟ evaluations, classified by three key 
methodologies. These methodologies are discussed at greater length in the 
following section, but briefly they can be defined as follows.  Simulation 
typically entails formally or informally modelling the nature of competition in a 
market, calibrating the parameters using real world information (sometimes 
estimated econometrically) and then assessing how the intervention will 
change the equilibrium relative to what would have happened without the 
intervention.  In the academic literature, this may be „full-fledged‟ (i.e. 
theoretically and econometrically often highly sophisticated); when used for 
evaluation by CAs, it is often more of a „back-of-envelope‟ calculation, based 
on simplified models and calibrated with „typical‟ values for parameters such 
as the demand elasticity.  Event Studies use the financial markets‟ 
assessment of the impact of an event.  In the context of say merger 
enforcement, the events in question are the initial announcement of the 
merger, the CA‟s announcement of investigation, and then its subsequent 
decision.  The effects are quantified by comparing movements in stock prices 
– both of the parties and their immediate rivals – with movements in more 
general stock price indices.  The Difference-in-differences (DiD) methodology 
involves a comparison of, say, prices before and after an event (e.g. merger 
                                            
3
  Our assessments are probably uncontroversial and are consistent with the emphases 
in previous literature surveys, for example, Bergman (2008) and Werden (2008)  
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or dawn raid) relative to some other real world control, i.e. a similar market 
without the event, or within the same market for firms not involved in the 
event.  Again, there is a variety of related less time- and data-intensive more 
ad-hoc methods, for example, estimating the extent of cartel overcharge by 
comparing prices within the cartel period with pre- or post-cartel prices.   
Table 1: Extent of evaluation literature by broad area of policy 
 Methodology 
Academic 
Literature 
CAs 
Enforcement 
Merger control Simulation Extensive Extensive 
 Event Studies Extensive Some 
 DiD etc Extensive Some 
Cartels/Article 101 Simulation Some Few 
 Event Studies Some Few 
 DiD etc Some Some 
Abuse/Article102 Simulation Few None 
 Event Studies None None 
 DiD etc Few None 
Non-enforcement: 
Advocacy None None None 
Compliance None None None 
Consumer Education None None None 
Most of the previous literature has concentrated heavily on mergers and  
cartels4. The academic literature is most developed and extensive for 
mergers, and this includes highly influential contributions on simulation, but 
also event studies and DiD.  In turn, these have had a strong impact on the 
evaluations undertaken by the CAs themselves, and it is commonplace for the 
major CAs to apply simulation models in their own evaluations.  There is also 
an extensive literature on cartel overcharge, with ad-hoc versions of DiD 
being more frequent (see section 3 below).  CAs sometimes employ the latter 
in their evaluations of the consumer benefits from cartel-busting. 
                                            
4
 The following sections reference many of the key academic contributions, but see also the 
surveys mentioned in the introduction for additional references. 
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Since mergers and cartels feature extensively in the remainder of this paper, 
the remaining preliminary comments here are confined to the other areas 
where evaluation has been much less common. 
2.2.1 Article 102 
Although our assessment that cases involving abuse of power (Art 102) have 
featured far less heavily in the existing evaluation literatures is impressionistic 
and not yet documented by reference to hard statistics, the following 
fragments of evidence strongly suggest that it is valid.  Davies‟s review (2010, 
Table 4.2), of the OFT‟s Impact Estimates, reveals that for 2006-9, while the 
OFT were able to evaluate 20 mergers, only 1 case of Article 102 
enforcement was assessed.  OXERA, in its report for the EC (2010, p.16) 
suggests that “There have been relatively few cases of exploitative abuse of 
dominance found by competition authorities or courts, either at the EU level, 
or in the Member States”.  In the US, Werden (2008, p.446) suggests that 
“Non-merger civil enforcement accounts for relatively few cases and for far 
less consumer savings than either criminal or merger enforcement”5. Similarly, 
within the academic literature, relevant studies are few.  This is probably 
symptomatic of a more general scarcity of empirical IO work in the broad area 
of Article 102.  For example, Slade (2008) concludes her survey of the 
empirical literature on the effects of vertical restraints (p.28) by suggesting 
that “Perhaps the most important lesson that can be learned …is how scant 
that evidence is, especially when compared to the amount of theoretical 
research.”   
There are two obvious explanations for this.  The first is, simply, that 
competition authorities bring relatively few cases of Article 102 abuse to 
fruition, and the second is that evaluation is unusually difficult to conduct in 
these cases.  Werden (2008, pp. 442-3) suggests that, certainly, the latter is 
true: “In assessing the effects of antitrust enforcement, cases involving 
                                            
5
   He explains that “Non-merger civil enforcement relates to single-competitor 
exclusionary conduct, vertical restraints and agreements among competitors other than hard-
core cartels or mergers”. 
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exclusionary conduct present the greatest challenge.  The effects of 
potentially exclusionary conduct are apt to be subtle and can be experienced 
long after the conduct itself”.  He points to the difficulties in establishing the 
extent to which rivals are harmed and the impact on consumers, and explains 
that delicate trade-offs are involved where the practice may entail an element 
of efficiency enhancement.  He also identifies predatory behaviour cases as 
particularly problematic, given the need to quantify short-run and long-run 
impacts of opposite directions.   
2.2.2 Advocacy 
It is sometimes argued that the benefits of advocacy activities may exceed 
those of a enforcement actions. Typically, competition authorities allocate a 
significant proportion of their budget to advocacy activities.6 Despite this, 
there has been little research measuring the impact of competition advocacy, 
and the work that has been done is predominantly qualitative. The OFT 
(2010b) conducted a survey, based on three case studies, of UK government 
officials to assess whether its competition related advice was taken into 
consideration and influenced policymakers. The FTC and the Italian 
Competition Authority have also both carried out detailed surveys to evaluate 
the impact of their advocacy activities7.  
Looking to the future, an obvious question is whether the methods used for 
assessing merger and cartel enforcement could be applied also to measuring 
the impact of advocacy. An obvious problem would be to identify the right 
counterfactual. For example to measure the impact of advocacy that resulted 
in the dropping of a piece of draft legislation which would have had 
anticompetitive consequences, we would need to know what would have 
happened had the anticompetitive proposal been enacted. For enforcement 
activities there is always the possibility to use a similar market as 
                                            
6
  The International Competition Network (2002) study on competition advocacy reported 
that amongst those countries that were able to quantify the resources they devoted to 
advocacy almost one third reported between 20 and 30%; the rest below 20%. 
7
  The FTC study is referred to in Majoras (2005) For the Italian study see: Arisi and 
Esposito (2007) 
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counterfactual, but in this case it would have to be a similar jurisdiction, 
something that would be even harder to find.8 It would also be hard to identify 
what version of the proposed legislation would have been accepted in 
absence of successful advocacy efforts. These concerns have also been 
identified by Evenett (2006).9   
2.2.3 Education: compliance by firms 
Encouraging business compliance with competition law is a potentially 
important dimension of CA activity.  However, attempts to measure the 
efficacy of compliance programmes per se are rare10.  In one example, OFT 
(2010a) presents some survey findings designed to understand what 
motivates business compliance and includes examples of their compliance 
activities. Responding firms mentioned reputational damage, financial 
penalties, individual sanctions (e.g.  risk of criminal proceedings) as key 
motivations for compliance.  Compliance is obviously linked to deterrence, 
which we discuss more generally in section 4.   
2.2.4 Education: consumers  
Much consumer education relates to consumer protection law and falls 
outside our remit.  However, insofar as better educated consumers should be 
less frequently exposed to asymmetric information, reduced market 
imperfections might enhance competition between firms.  Again, this is an 
under-researched area, but some CAs are beginning to work on evaluation in 
this area. 11 
                                            
8
   It may be equally hard to show that a proposed piece of legislation was prevented as a 
result of advocacy rather than other political considerations. 
9
  As Evenett points out, the problems are even greater in assessing competition 
advocacy in the broader sense, such as increasing public awareness. 
10
  The scarcity of evidence also reflects the fact that in many countries the CA is not 
allowed to carry out compliance activities. 
11
  For the OFT, see: OFT (2010c) p.30 fn.45.  See also OECD‟s report on best practice of 
the Communication of competition authorities at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/40/2492536.pdf  
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2.3 Structure of the paper 
Section 2 describes and assesses the three main evaluation methodologies. 
Sections 3 and 4 address some of the questions raised in Section 2, but 
which are not peculiar to any particular methodology.  Firstly, Section 3 
discusses the fundamental issue in any evaluation exercise: the choice of 
counterfactual.  It illustrates some of the issues by reference to a comparative 
assessment of how cartel overcharge has been evaluated in the past.  
Section 4 turns to arguably the biggest challenge faced by the evaluation 
project – the possibility that results may be seriously undermined by pervasive 
biases in the nature of sample cases typically used in evaluation.  Section 5 
concludes by drawing together our „future research priorities‟. 
3. Literature Survey of methodologies 
3.1 A Taxonomy   
This section summarises the previous literatures, focusing mainly on the three 
methodologies, with a brief discussion of all other methodologies at the 
section end.  We refer to this as our „taxonomy‟ of methodologies: there are at 
least three other taxonomies in the recent literature: Bergman (2008), 
Buccirossi et al. (2006), OXERA (2009)12.  The first two are sufficiently similar 
to our own for us to merely refer the interested reader to the original papers, 
but OXERA (2009) is sufficiently different to merit a short summary here. The 
authors group the existing methods and models into three broad types:  
 Comparator based, which includes (i) DiD (ii) cross-section (across 
firms, markets or countries) econometrics or averages, and (iii) time 
series econometrics or interpolation for during, before and/or after. 
 Market structure based using IO models especially structural models. 
                                            
12
   This is a commissioned study report for the European Commission on Quantifying 
antitrust damages There are obvious parallels (although by no means always exact) between 
the savings that CAs achieve for consumers from removing anti-competitive practices and 
claims for damages against defendants responsible for inflicting losses on their customers 
and rivals and/or suppliers. 
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 Financial analysis based, including event studies but also other more  
descriptive techniques  well established in accountancy/finance. 
This taxonomy is more exhaustive than our own, but their three categories 
correspond fairly closely to our own categories DiD (loosely defined), 
simulation and event studies respectively. 
3.2 Simulation 
3.2.1 Definition 
By simulation, we refer to evaluation based on (i) explicit formal modelling of 
the nature of competition in the market, then (ii) calibrating the model with real 
world information (sometimes estimated econometrically), before (iii) using it 
to assess how the equilibrium will change with and without an 
event/intervention.  
Thus, in the first stage, a model is selected based on a reading of the nature 
of oligopoly in the market concerned: Are products homogeneous or 
differentiated?  Are there capacity constraints? Do firms act unilaterally or in a 
coordinated way?  If products are differentiated, are they symmetrically so, or 
is competition more localised?  This stage often involves  a structural model 
derived from a game theoretic perspective, coupled with a particular model of 
the demand system, e.g. logit, nested logit or random utility.  In the second 
stage, the model‟s parameters are calibrated. This will sometimes be derived 
from direct observation (e.g. existing market shares, prices and extraneous 
estimates of demand elasticities), but in other contexts, it may be necessary 
to undertake full-blown econometric estimation of the demand system in order 
to derive estimates of those parameters.  By substitution of these „known‟ 
parameters into the equilibrium conditions derived in stage 1, one can then 
recover (i.e. solve for) other, unknown, parameters.  In some cases these 
unknowns might be the firms‟ marginal costs, in others they might be 
parameters which summarise the extent of „market power‟.  
In the third stage, the post-event equilibrium is simulated using the calibrated 
parameters, to derive comparative statics.  For example when evaluating the 
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effects of prohibiting a merger, the pre-merger equilibrium is compared with 
the hypothetical non-intervened equilibrium, allowing for coordination in the 
price-setting of the brands of the newly merged firm, any claimed synergy 
effects and reactions by outsiders (i.e. competitors).  In principle, one might 
also simulate a switch in the prevailing behaviour of firms as a consequence 
of the merger; for example, if it is suspected that the merger would result in a 
coordinated effect between merging and non-merging firms, one could 
compute alternative collusive post-merger equilibria.  Rather more difficult are 
the possibilities that firms might want to reposition their products, or where the 
potential for new entry becomes important. 
Simulation may be either ex-ante or ex-post counterfactual analysis.  The 
latter is backward-looking - what outcome would have happened, had, say, a 
cartel not actually existed; while ex-ante looks forward – anticipating whether 
or not, say, a merger would have had coordinated effects, if cleared.  When 
the perspective is ex-ante, but conducted after the event, a decision must be 
made as to whether the counterfactual estimates should draw on all 
information available, or merely the information that would have been 
available at the time of the policy decision.  So, for example, when 
retrospectively evaluating the impact of a particular merger intervention, 
should actual post-merger prices be compared with those projected from the 
simulation model, or should these be adjusted for any post-intervention 
exogenous shocks, (say a demand shock)?  Of course, the latter requires a 
reworking of the original model, now simulating the impact of that shock, as 
well as the original intervention.  This is discussed further in the context of 
merger remedies by Davies and Lyons (2007 pp.106-7). 
3.2.2 Previous literature 
Seminal and/or illustrative contributions in the academic literature include 
Hausman and Leonard (1997), Werden (2000), Nevo (2000), Pinske and 
Slade (2004), Ivaldi and Verboven (2005), and Peters (2006).  Simulation is 
less common in evaluating the effects of cartel interventions, but see 
Verboven and Van Dijk (2009). 
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3.2.3 Pros and cons 
The major strength of the simulation approach is the explicit use of theory to 
identify the counterfactual.  This facilitates the „joining-up‟ of the analysis 
undertaken at the time of the intervention with any subsequent evaluation of 
the effects of the policy, and, in turn, provides a clear opportunity for 
evaluating the assumptions made at the time of the intervention.   
However, as is well documented, simulation is very sensitive to modelling 
assumptions.  Sometimes this is a strength, e.g. in revealing how sensitive 
predictions are to the precise nature of the counterfactual.  But sometimes this 
sensitivity is unhelpful, deriving from alternative specifications between which 
there are no strong theoretical reasons to choose, e.g. the functional form of 
the demand curve.  These qualifications are well documented elsewhere (see 
for example Buccirossi et al. (2006), Appendix II.)   
Equally important, simulation is better suited for some types of oligopoly 
models (and therefore markets) than others.  The trusted and well-tried 
workhorses are the Cournot homogeneous product model, and logit type 
models of product differentiation. Invariably, the emphasis is on price and 
quantity to the exclusion of innovation, repositioning etc, and possible 
changes in conduct (relevant to Coordinated Effects.)  Buyer power has also 
proved difficult to incorporate satisfactorily, and  simulation of bidding markets 
is still in its relative infancy.  This raises the strong likelihood that evaluation 
based on simulation is heavily skewed towards certain types of markets, i.e. 
sample selection bias.   
Another source of potential selection bias derives from the heavy demands on 
data.  Many of the seminal studies are based on high quality disaggregated 
datasets constructed from scanner sources; but, of course, these are typically 
drawn from a relatively small set of consumer good products (often sold 
through supermarkets.) 
Finally, there is mixed evidence on how well simulation predicts actual 
outcomes. Ashenfelter and Hosken (2008, p.36) summarise on this count by 
suggesting that “careful evaluation of their effectiveness seems long overdue”.  
15 
 
3.2.4 Back of the envelope (simple) simulation 
As mentioned, full-fledged simulation is extremely demanding of data and 
research time.  Faced with this, CAs in their own evaluation exercises often 
employ simplified versions of simulation models (the only viable option if the 
CA is to evaluate a range of mergers investigated in a given year.)  Typically,  
most of their effort is directed to those mergers which are acceptably 
described by the Cournot model or simple models of differentiation13 In order 
to calibrate these, extraneous estimates of demand elasticities are required, 
but there is often a scarcity of good estimates.  In these circumstances, 
Werden (2008) reports that the US typically employs a range of 1 to 1.5 for 
the aggregate industry demand elasticity, but is not obvious whether this is a 
reasonable ball-park range.  Such inelastic demand will inevitably lead to high 
predicted price increases.  As noted by Bergman (2008, p.394) “There exist 
amazingly few econometric studies of the price effects of mergers, 
considering the economic importance of mergers and given that merger 
effects is a topic that is well suited for this type of quantitative analysis”.  
Below, we discuss Connor‟s painstaking meta-analyses of cartels, but there 
appears to be no equivalent for mergers.  At the very least, there is an 
obvious gap to be filled by a similar sort of meta-analysis of the industry 
demand price elasticity – given its key role in most simulation. 
3.3 Event studies 
3.3.1 Definition 
An event study draws on financial market data to measure the effect of an 
economic event on the market valuation of a firm.  If financial markets are 
efficient, then the effect of any event on a firm‟s discounted profits will be 
instantaneously observable through the changes in the prices of its shares.  
The methodology entails measuring any abnormal returns associated with an 
event (e.g. the announcement of a merger.  Abnormal returns are identified as 
                                            
13
   For those markets which do not fit the bill, simple „rules of thumb‟ tend to be used, e.g. 
the OFT assumes that an intervened merger (which it cannot simulate) would have raised 
price by 1%.  
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the difference between the observed movement in stock valuation and those 
that would have occurred absent the event.      
3.3.2 Previous literature 
Event studies of mergers typically examine the effect of the announcements 
of the merger and the CA‟s decision (i.e. the type of intervention) on the 
valuation of the merging firms and their rivals.14 For Europe, Duso et al. 
(2006a) examine the effectiveness of merger control in general, and Duso et 
al. (2005) focuses more specifically on merger remedies. For Australia,   
Diepold et al. (2006) apply the methodology to 50 mergers handled by the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission between 1996-2003. 
Examples of industry specific studies include Simpson and Hosken (1998), for 
FTC investigations on four retail mergers between 1984 and 1993, and 
Warren-Boulton and Dalkir (2001), for the Staples – Office Depot merger.  
Event studies on cartels typically examine the impact of dawn raids and the 
subsequent CA decisions, for example Langus and Motta (2007) for  EC 
cartel enforcement, and Bosch and Eckard (1991) for US DOJ decisions. 
Lübbers (2009) studied the effect of cartelisation (a coal syndicate) in 
Germany, 1893-1913, where the events analysed were the foundation of the 
syndicate and two major modifications to the original contract.  
More generally, Carletti et al. (2009) analyse the impact of the introduction, or 
modification in competition laws in 18 jurisdictions. They find that pro-
competitive regulatory changes lead to negative abnormal returns on firms‟ 
shares, with the exception of the banking sector, where the opposite effect is 
observed -  suggesting that merger control is anticipated to act as a check 
and balance on prudential control.15  Other related subjects where event 
                                            
14
  Eckbo (1985) is an early discussion of why the effects on rivals‟ valuation provides 
important additional information.  
15
  Other examples of measuring the effect of regulatory change, although not for 
competition laws, include: Becher (2009), who looks at the effect of US interstate deregulation 
in the banking sector; and Prager (1989), who examines the effect of the Interstate 
Commerce Act in the railroad industry. A major problem with using event studies to measure 
the impact of regulatory changes is the definition of the event window. Regulatory changes 
are lengthy procedures, typically starting with drafting at administrative level, before the 
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studies have been used include private antitrust litigation (Bizjak and Coles 
(1995) and the effects of entry (Whinston and Collins (1992)). However, to the 
best of our knowledge, the effectiveness of Article 102 enforcement has not 
been assessed using the event study methodology.  
3.3.3 Pros and cons 
Central to the event study is the assumed rationality of markets, the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH), according to which share prices instantly reflect the 
value to investors of all the relevant information available to them. It builds 
upon information that is generated by the interaction between a large number 
of self-interested, independent, rational market agents. This information then 
can be thought of as the best estimate, given the set of all available 
information. 
If the EMH holds, then the change in the market‟s valuation of a company will 
always reflect an unbiased estimate which is both “objective” and quick. This 
therefore enables a quicker assessment than from using more direct 
measures such as product prices. The methodology may be particularly 
attractive to CAs as it tackles the issue of information asymmetry between 
them and the firms involved in the event.  This makes event studies more 
appealing than analysis of accounting data, which typically suffers from the 
potential bias that such information is produced by the interested parties.  It is 
also argued that event studies are undemanding of data - the necessary data 
are easily accessible for listed firms (but see below).  
However, the plausibility of the EMH assumption is open to question, and 
many commentators are sceptical.  Werden (2008) suggests that the 
presumption that „the instant analysis of uninformed investors is more 
                                                                                                                             
proposal is carried on to parliamentary committees, brought to the chamber floor, and finally 
approved by the parliament. During this process, information about the proposal is often 
made public. As the content of the legislative draft may continuously evolve, it is hard to 
define an appropriate event window.  
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accurate than the painstaking work of enforcement agencies with access to 
confidential documents and data‟ is not supported by evidence.16 
Turning more specifically to mergers, the main area of competition policy 
where event studies have been used, Table 2 illustrates, by summarising how 
expectations about how each of the three constituent events should change 
the merging parties‟ market value: at each stage, there is the potential for 
ambiguity.  An increase in valuation of the merging parties may reflect either 
pro-competitive effects (efficiency gains), or anticompetitive effects (exclusion, 
dominance, or collusion).  Duso et al. (2006b) argue that this ambiguity can 
be resolved by observing the change in the valuation of rival firms.  According 
to most static oligopoly models, horizontal mergers will result in a higher 
product price unless there are offsetting efficiency gains; while the former will 
also benefit rivals, the latter will not.  However, as the final row shows, the 
ambiguity does not completely disappear. For example although an observed 
negative change in the rivals‟ valuation may reveal pro-competitive (efficiency) 
expectations, it may also indicate anticompetitive (exclusion) effects. 
Table 2: Expected effects of a (horizontal) merger on merging firms’ and rivals’ asset 
values 
Source of post-merger 
gains 
Merger proposals Announcement of 
investigation 
Merger 
clearance 
Effect on: Merging 
firms 
Rivals Merging 
firms 
Rivals Merging 
firms 
Rivals 
Dominance or collusion + + – – + +
17
 
Efficiency + – – + + –
18
 
Exclusion  + – – + + – 
There is also the possibility that the merger may be interpreted as a signal 
that other firms in the same market will be subject to merger activities in the 
                                            
16
  See also Malkiel (2003) for a more general criticism of EMH. 
17
  The situation would be different for vertical mergers, which can potentially have 
foreclosure effects, and would therefore result in negative abnormal returns. 
18
  Assuming that competitors cannot free-ride on merger generated efficiencies. 
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near future,19 which would increase the market valuation of rivals, resulting in 
the same sign of change as with collusive and/or dominant outcomes.  
Although Da Graca (2006) proposes a method for eliminating simultaneity 
biases, this still remains an under-explored issue.  A further criticism is that 
the methodology does not separate out the market‟s anticipation of the CA‟s 
eventual decision, therefore its reaction to an „antitrust event‟ may equally be 
explained by the market updating its beliefs about a particular antitrust 
decision, once the uncertainty about the merger investigation is resolved. 
Duso et al. (2006a) address this problem by using observable merger 
characteristics to estimate the probability of a particular decision and correct 
the average abnormal returns accordingly. 
The pros and cons are similar for assessing cartel enforcement. However, in 
this case (characterised by a higher level of CA secrecy), in order to ensure 
the success of the investigation), there is more chance that the first event 
(typically in the form of a dawn-raid) will actually be „unanticipated news‟ to 
the market. Also, the theoretical expectations are less ambiguous.  The effect 
of news of the investigation and the ultimate decision nearly unambiguously 
reduce the valuation of the parties. The one exception is when insufficient 
sanctions are announced. In this case the negative effect stemming from the 
elimination of cartel profit may be mitigated by a smaller than expected fine.   
An obvious question in general is how well do event studies predict actual 
outcomes? For mergers, Duso et al. (2006c) compare the results of an event 
study with an ex post analysis of balance sheet profits.  They find that in some 
cases the abnormal returns measured in event studies are positively and 
significantly correlated with the ex post measured profitability of the same 
mergers. Although this provides some affirmative evidence, it is not totally 
persuasive and further and possibly deeper statistical analysis is required.20 
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  Cox and Portes (1998) claim that this happened in the merger of SBC Communications 
and Pacific Telesis Group. 
20
  For example when calculating the ex post profit effect of the merger, the counterfactual 
used is the median firm in the same market minus the effective rivals. The authors assume 
that these firms are not strongly affected by the merger, but this assumption needs more 
evidence especially for large mergers, which may affect the profit figures of other – not 
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Finally, in spite of the general presumption that event studies are easy to use 
and data are easily accessed from financial databases, the practical reality is 
that there are many circumstances when appropriate data are not available.  It 
is, of course, a necessary condition that the parties and their rivals should all 
be quoted on the stock market, but this is often not the case in small numbers 
markets especially where firms are small and rivals are scarce.  Moreover, 
very often the parties are large conglomerates and/or multinational, and the 
market concerned may constitute only a small part of its aggregate activities; 
where this is the case, it can often prove difficult to identify any effect on the 
firm‟s valuation resulting from an event in a small market in a particular 
country.  These practical difficulties are cited by inter alia Buccirossi et al. 
(2006, p.187-8), but perhaps the most telling indictment is provided by 
Beverley (2008) who attempts to apply the methodology to a sample of 9 UK 
Competition Commission merger inquiries but is ultimately frustrated by an 
inability to locate sufficient competitors with traded equities and merging 
parties for whom the market concerned accounts for a sufficiently large 
proportion of their activities.  It seems very likely that event studies of samples 
of mergers will suffer from an inherent selection bias for these reasons. 
3.4 Difference in Differences 
3.4.1 Definition 
Difference-in-differences (DiD) methods belong to a broad category of 
methodologies sometimes known (rather unhelpfully) as evaluation methods 
(see Buccirossi et al. (2006), Appendix I), which also includes natural 
experiments and matching methods. The basic idea is to evaluate 
„performance‟ before and after an event (or sometimes before, during and 
after) in the market concerned relative to performance in another similar 
(control) market, unaffected by the event.  The standard DiD application is 
                                                                                                                             
directly competing – firms in the market. The main worry however is that their results in 
general show that the stock market reaction is positively correlated with the ex post 
development of profit typically in cases where a longer event-window is used. This raises 
doubts whether the stock market reaction is actually a reaction to the merger or it picks up 
other confounding effects as well. 
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typically econometric, in which the performance measure (usually product 
price) is tracked over time to include the pre- and post-periods in the 
treatment (e.g. merger) and compared against the same in the control market, 
with the use of dummy variables. For the purposes of this paper we shall also 
loosely include in this category the much simpler methods (sometimes used 
by the CAs) described at the end of this sub-section.  
DiD analysis is typically conducted ex-post. The time lag before it is 
undertaken reflects a trade-off between choosing a sufficiently long post-event 
period to gain a better grasp of long-term effects, and avoiding a time period 
which is so long as to compromise the chances of finding a practicable control 
to emulate the counterfactual. There are also some instances of ex ante DiD 
analyses, for example for predictin the effect of cartel intervention (which 
presumes overcharge is removed).  
3.4.2 Previous literature 
Examples of DiD for cartels include Symeonidis (2002), who assesses the 
impact of the introduction of the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act. In the 
UK.  Levenstein and Suslow (2006) examined the impact of the 1982 United 
States‟ Export Trading Company Act by comparing manufacturing industries 
with and without export cartel exemption.  
However, DID is most typically applied as an ex post tool for evaluating the 
effect of mergers. Although very popular, there is an inherent problem with 
using DiD for mergers: if the chosen control group is other non-merging rivals, 
then how does one allow for the possible externalities of the merger on those 
rivals?  Tenn and Yun (2010) for example looked at the effect of US 
divestitures in the Johnson & Johnson/Pfizer acquisition. Although the authors 
concede that their choice of control group (similar brands in the same 
category) may mean that the treatment (divestitures) had an effect on the 
control group, they claim that this does not raise serious concerns when 
simply looking at whether divestitures had an effect at all on prices. We are 
not convinced that this is indeed the case.  Ashenfelter and Hosken (2008) 
looked at the price impact of 5 US mergers using a set of different control 
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groups: in the event, their preferred choice was private label products sold in 
the same industry.  Their rationale for this preferred control group was that 
private labels are only weak substitutes, from the consumer‟s viewpoint, for 
the higher quality branded products affected by the merger.  At least to the 
current authors, familiar with the UK supermarket industry, this would seem to 
be highly contestable. There are similar doubts with Dobson and Piga (2009) 
use as controls airline routes from different but close airport-pairs.  
R.A. Connor et al. (1998) attempted to measure the impact of 112 American 
hospital mergers, using a database of around 3500 hospitals. Their method 
essentially follows a difference-in-differences approach, where the treatment 
markets were those with mergers, and the control was taken from the 
remaining set of markets.  
There are few examples where DiD has been applied to Article 102 cases, 
deterrence, or other effects of public intervention. An early equivalent is Shaw 
and Simpson (1986) analysis of the erosion of market dominance in markets 
where the Monopolies and Mergers Commission was active (markets not 
investigated by the MMC were the control group). There are also some 
examples where DiD has been used to assess the impact of other types of 
regulatory intervention. For instance, Cooper et al. (2010) used a DiD 
estimator to test whether the introduction of hospital competition in the English 
NHS in January 2006 has led to increased efficiency. 
3.4.3 Pros and cons 
The difference-in-differences approach enjoys an (at least superficial) appeal 
that it is uses observed data from the relevant product market (i.e. what 
actually happens) in comparison with a control (which if carefully selected), 
where the event does not occur. Thus the counterfactual is not dependent on 
untestable, maybe restrictive, theoretical assumptions.  
However, the other side to the coin is that the methodology, is inevitably 
atheoretical. Since much depends in evaluation on the nature of the 
counterfactual this means that a key part of the methodology – identifying an 
appropriate control group – is also atheoretical.  As such, there is a danger 
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that the choice of counterfactual (control group) is constrained by „what is out 
there‟, i.e. the best of a set of alternatives, none of which is entirely 
appropriate.  When choosing the control market the ideal is that it is 
characterised by the same supply and demand shocks as the treatment 
market, which makes it possible to filter out the net effect of the analysed 
event by controlling for these supply and demand shocks. But Simpson (2008) 
warns about the danger of this assumption, claiming that even the same 
supply and demand shocks may influence prices differently in the two 
markets.  
On a practical level, the control should have a sufficient number of members 
and time observations to emulate the random variation which would occur in 
the treatment group post intervention that is unrelated to the intervention itself. 
Most research however just assumes that the only difference between the 
treatment and the control groups is the treatment21. Meyer (1994) identifies 
some of the limitations of this approach, such as omitted variables, trends in 
outcomes, measurement error, simultaneity, selection bias, omitted 
interactions, etc.  
Overall, difficulties in identifying a satisfactory control must raise the worry 
that DiD may only be useable for a fairly small sample of markets, and a 
sample which may not be representative of the population as a whole.. 
3.4.4 Simple/ Back of envelope 
Simple variations on DiD are sometimes used by CAs in ex-ante decision-
making and/or evaluation.  This might involve identifying similar geographic or 
product markets where similar events occurred in the past. 22  The literature 
on estimating cartel overcharge includes many instances (academic papers 
and CA evaluations) where the overcharge is simply equated to the difference 
                                            
21
  See Buccirossi et al. (2006) for a discussion of the selection bias which will occur if the 
set of unobservable characteristics which affect the decision to merge also affect the 
performance of the parties post-merger. 
22
  Informal examples of this approach can sometimes be found in CC‟s evaluations of 
merger interventions and market investigations.   
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between price during cartel with pre- and post-cartel prices in the same 
market, or in similar non-cartelised markets. 
3.5 Others  
There is also a variety of other, mainly qualitative, approaches which we 
discuss more briefly since they lie largely outside the subject area of the 
present paper. 
3.5.1 Aggregate Economy  Studies 
Some more aggregate studies employ cross-country or panel data, attempting 
to identify the effects of competition policy on macro or sector aggregates, 
e.g. price-cost margins, GDP, productivity23.  These are discussed and well 
summarised by Bergman (2008, section 3.4 „Macro-level studies‟), who 
provides some of the key references.  Necessarily they confront daunting 
measurement issues, often relying on the construction of subjective indexes 
of the „severity of competition policy‟ which are allowed to differ across 
countries.  Other econometric problems are familiar in any international 
comparisons based on production functions or related concepts, e.g. 
identification, simultaneity and the requirement that the underlying functional 
forms are stable across countries. 
3.5.2 Follow up surveys of the parties/rivals/customers/suppliers 
It is quite common for CAs to undertake or commission reviews of their 
previous cases (especially mergers) based on follow up questionnaires and/or 
interviews with the interested parties and related firms24.  These often provide 
invaluable insights but are inevitably prone to a number of potential 
limitations: low response rates, respondent bias, the parties often have short 
corporate memories, and in their view, interventions can often be overtaken 
by other subsequent and more important events. Clarke et al. (1998) includes 
a number of examples of the latter. 
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  See Bergman (2008) for a discussion and selected references. 
24
  A recent example for UK merger policy is Deloitte (2009) 
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3.5.3 Expert commentaries on specific cases 
Book collections of expert (economic) commentaries on specific, often well 
know anti-trust case studies, such as Kwoka and White (2004) and Lyons 
(2009) for the US and EU respectively, can also be viewed as contributing to 
the evaluation literature, but for obvious reasons, it is difficult to generalise 
from a set of heterogeneous non-randomly selected small samples, especially 
with respect to the evaluation methodologies used (if any). 
3.5.4 Court decisions 
Some studies have assessed the quality of CA decision-making by the 
frequency of court appeals and/or the success rates in those appeals (see 
Bergman (2008, p.389-91) for a brief survey.)  For certain purposes this may 
be a valuable extra source of (presumably well-informed and objective) 
evaluation, but obvious limitations include the likelihood of selection bias, and 
the fact that court decisions will sometimes involve judgement on the 
correctness of legal process rather than economic substance. 
3.5.5 Surveys of peer/practitioner opinions 
Certain high-profile annual reviews provide an alternative approach, based on 
peer review evaluation of the performance of different CAs around the world, 
e.g. the Global Competition Review and OECD country reviews.25  These 
enable international comparisons over time at the aggregate level, but these 
lie outside our current remit, being based on subjective opinion rather than 
quantitative methodologies. 
3.6 Preliminary conclusions  
Rather than argue for the primacy of any one methodology over the others, 
we suggest, uncontroversially, that different methodologies are better suited 
for some purposes than others.  When evaluating a specific intervention (e.g. 
a particular cartel or merger), the event study and DiD may be appropriate, 
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  http:/www.oecd.org/document/43/0,3343,en_2649_33759_2489707_1_1_1_1,00.html  
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assuming availability of the necessary data; expert retrospective case study 
commentaries can also be attractive.   On the other hand, when evaluating 
the  quality of the CA‟s decision-making - analysis, data collection etc,  the 
event study and DiD are less attractive, since neither is based on explicit 
theory.  Here, simulation scores more strongly, since it forces us to articulate 
the model, make specific assumptions (about entry, capacity etc.) and to 
specify the data to be collected – precisely the purpose of the evaluation, i.e. 
the accuracy of assumptions, rather than the magnitudes of price increases.  
When aggregating the overall impact assessment of policy over full range of  
cases handled in a given year it is noticeable how often the CAs turn to simple 
simulation methods, supported where necessary by rules of thumb.  Indeed, it 
is not obvious how event studies and DiD could be applied over a large 
number of different cases due to their much greater demands on time and 
data.   
Having said this, we believe that the most important messages to emerge 
from reviewing this literature concern not so much the relative merits of 
specific methodologies, but more with the problems which seem to afflict all of 
them.  Here we highlight four general issues, each meriting future research. 
3.6.1 Paucity of evaluation of Article 102 cases 
In both the academic literature and the CAs‟ own evaluations, there has been 
far less work on Article 102 than on mergers and cartels, and this raises a 
number of questions.  Is it that existing methodologies are not suited to Article 
102 cases, or is it simply that CAs prosecute far fewer Article 102 cases?  If 
the latter, is this because competition policy is more effective in deterring the 
violation of Article 102, or are CAs less adept at uncovering them, or less 
inclined to intervene?  If it is true that CAs are significantly less active and/or 
successful in this area, is this because cases are more difficult to prove, and 
that CAs are tempted towards the softer areas of merger enforcement?  Or is 
it that net harm in most 102 cases is considered to be too small to merit much 
priority? Of course, these questions are of wider importance than just for the 
evaluation agenda, and improving our understanding of the reasons should be 
high on the research agenda.   
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3.6.2 Selection bias 
Each of the broad methodologies discussed here tends to be better suited for 
some types of market than other – but for different reasons.  Simulation is 
most easily and most often applied to unilateral effects horizontal mergers, 
where the product is homogenous or can be described with a standard model 
of product differentiation; but coordinated effects, innovation markets and 
vertical mergers pose greater problems and have attracted far fewer studies.  
Event studies are impracticable in markets of non-quoted or highly 
conglomerate firms, and where rivals are scarce.  DiD requires the existence 
of genuinely unaffected firms in the same market or the coincidence of a 
similar control market.  In each case therefore, we cannot rule out the 
possibility of pervasive selection bias in the make-up of samples on which 
many evaluation studies have been based. 
3.6.3 The need for longer-term studies 
Invariably, the above methodologies model impact only over a relatively short-
term, while a longer term perspective might often be desirable.  Consider 
merger simulation for example - here, the essence of the evaluation is a 
comparison of two equilibria (with and without) which are both conceptually 
timeless.  Typically, it is assumed that an evaluation period of one or two 
years after the event will be sufficient.  Despite an awareness that there may 
be longer-term consequences (e.g. efficiency savings, new entry, brand 
repositioning), these are rarely incorporated into the modelling.   For instance, 
very often, but not always, simulation abstracts from the possibility of 
efficiency savings and in the short-run, this may be appropriate.  However,  
where efficiency gains may only emerge say 2-3 years after merger,26 as the 
benefits of restructuring start to appear; if so, what is essentially a static 
counterfactual becomes less less appropriate.  The same is often true for DiD, 
in which the post event period is typically short because the interventions 
examined are usually fairly recent.  It might be that event studies avoid this 
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  Which seems to be the average pre-merger expectation by merging parties, see 
Ormosi (2010b)  
28 
 
problem insofar as financial markets are supposed to anticipate all future 
events, but this does strain one‟s faith in the EMH.  
There is also another, more general, concern about the time dimension which 
applies to any one-off evaluation (no matter what the methodology) – that it 
runs the risk of closing the story prematurely.  The wider IO literature (both 
theoretical and empirical) suggests various possibilities for how a specific 
event might trigger a sequence or chain of subsequent events -  each of 
which might be evaluated independently, but which are in reality clearly path-
dependent.  This means that when evaluating an isolated intervention, we 
might ignore the longer-term consequences.  For example, the literature on 
endogenous mergers alerts us to the possibility that, if merger A is cleared, 
this makes a subsequent merger B more or less likely.  Similarly, in failing firm 
merger cases, the consequences of intervention may include subsequent 
alternative merger proposals by other parties. There is also case study 
evidence which suggests that sometimes when some practice is prohibited, it 
is replaced by others. Clarke et al. (1998) cite examples from the UK where 
firms responded to the prohibition of one form of vertical restraint by 
introducing an alternative form (Ice Cream), or where a prohibited restraint 
was replaced by full-fledged integration (Travel Agents).  More generally, it 
has long been recognised that horizontal mergers may sometimes be an 
alternative to cartelisation:  Symeonidis (2002) shows that cartel legislation in 
the UK in the 1950s provoked a subsequent merger wave through the 1960s.  
In other words, it matters what happens next, and next should sometimes be 
interpreted as long-term and not too narrowly.  Some evaluation studies have 
acknowledged this, albeit indirectly, by considering sequences of cases, for 
example Sabbatini (2008) for Italian baby-milk; Pinske and Slade (2004) for a 
sequence of mergers in UK beer and Nevo (2000) who includes various 
different mergers in his simulations, but these are the exception rather than 
the rule.   
3.6.4 The counterfactual 
A central issue running throughout most antitrust analysis is the choice of the 
counterfactual – what would have happened, had some event, policy or 
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practice not occurred?  This is not just a concern for academic economists, it 
also occupies the attention of the courts and lawyers, for example when 
attempting to quantify damages27.  It has both conceptual and empirical 
dimensions – which counterfactuals are theoretically tenable, and how do we 
calibrate them with plausible estimates of key parameters?   
Clearly, the counterfactual has a crucial role in the present context - any 
evaluation methodology must necessarily entail a counterfactual, even if it is 
sometimes only implicit.  In effect, much of our discussion so far can be 
interpreted as questioning the nature of the counterfactual assumptions 
employed by different methodologies - both in specific cases, but also more 
generally – are some methodologies intrinsically more counterfactual-aware 
than others?   
Simulation, by its nature, places the choice of counterfactual conspicuously at 
centre stage: a specific oligopoly model is selected, and this immediately 
reveals the nature of the assumed counterfactual equilibrium. Similarly, it 
must be calibrated very transparently with key parameter estimates.   
In DiD, the control plays the role of the counterfactual – for example, what 
would have happened in the UK, had RPM for books not been repealed, 
might be captured by what actually happened over the same period in 
Germany, where it was not repealed (Davies and Olczak (2008).  Here, the 
choice of counterfactual is less theoretically driven, and the strength of the 
methodology rests on whether there really is a control (with adequate data) 
which is sufficiently similar.  In practice, data expediency may sometimes 
distract attention from how closely this condition is met.  
While it is less common to think of the counterfactual in the typical event 
study, implicitly it is still there - captured by whatever comparator share price 
index the practitioner uses to compute abnormal returns.  Here there is a 
trade-off between using a general index, which is less likely to be sensitive to 
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  For a useful cross-discipline of the use of counterfactuals in antitrust and mergers, see 
Colley and Marsden (2010) at: 
http://www.biicl.org/files/5106_the_use_of_the_counterfactual_in_antitrustv2.pdf. 
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market-specific exogenous events, and more customised sector-specific 
indexes, which may not be truly independent of the event at issue.   
While there are various other gaps in the literature deserving of further 
research28, we confine the remainder of this paper to further discussion of the 
counterfactual and selection bias.   
4. Comparing counterfactuals: cartels as a case study 
An ideal approach for comparing the alternative evaluation methodologies 
would be to assemble an (ideally very large) random sample of cases, and 
attempt to apply all the methodologies to all cases in the sample.  This would 
help both in assessing their relative practicabilities and in identifying any 
systematic differentials in their estimates.  While it is likely that some CAs and 
advising consultancies do sometimes conduct parallel assessments during 
their conduct of a particular case (experimenting simultaneously with, say, an 
event study and a simulation), these do not appear in the published literature 
of course.  More generally, attempting such a task across a large sample of 
cases would be difficult, and, in the event, has not occurred to date.   
In this section therefore, we explore the feasibility of an alternative, second-
best, approach.  We examine an existing database already in the public 
domain, on cartel overcharge, constructed by Connor and various co-authors.  
It is a meta-analysis, drawing together the results from a very large number of 
primary studies by previous authors. It includes 800 observations, taken from 
nearly 400 cartel episodes across the world. This is a only second best to our 
ideal, because the overcharge estimate for each cartel has been computed 
typically using only a single methodology - for very few of the cartels do we 
have alternative estimates using different methodologies.  This means that 
relatively higher power matched sample tests are impossible, but the sheer 
size of the sample should nevertheless permit reasonably meaningful tests 
between sample means for different methodologies. 
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  Notable amongst the other gaps are the absence of any large scale meta analysis of 
the price raising effects of mergers, and of a practitioners‟ encyclopaedia of price elasticities.   
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The version of the version of the database we use here is summarised in 
Bolotova and Connor (2005) (C&B). The main purpose of their paper was to 
examine the determinants of overcharge, and the methodologies used to 
derive the estimates was merely a minor side issue – to be controlled for.  But 
for us here, this is the main focus of attention. 
C&B classify the estimation methods used in the primary studies into eight 
broad groups.  Of these, we discard about 30% of cases which belong to 
three of the groups since they do not correspond to any of our methodologies 
above: sundry/unknown „historical records‟, and  „cost calculations‟.  Three of 
the retained categories correspond roughly to component parts of DiD: 
PBEFORE (PAFTER) are comparisons between the within-cartel-period price 
and the price immediately before (after) the cartel period, and YARDST are 
relative to prices in yardstick „analogous markets that were believed to be free 
from cartelization‟. The PWAR, „price-war‟ method compares prices within the 
lifetime of a cartel, but distinguishes sub-periods with and without price wars. 
Finally, the ECON, „Econometric‟, category is very broad based, but appears 
to include estimates based on simulation-type methods.  C&B (2006, p.1120)   
Table 3 shows the proportions of cases in each category and our calculation 
of their sample mean overcharge estimates29.  They fall within a broadly 
similar range (23% - 45%), but with an intriguing ranking – price wars being 
the highest and price-after the lowest.    
Table 3: Methods of estimating overcharge 
 % Mean overcharge 
Price before 33 29 
Price after 11 23 
Price war 2 45 
Yardstick 
competition 
11 39 
Econometric 15 31 
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  C&B do not report these means directly in their paper, but we have recovered them 
from their reported preliminary regression of overcharge solely against dummy variables for 
each category – in that case, regression coefficients coincide with the sample mean values. 
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A simple null hypothesis is that each sub-sample (i.e. for each methodology) 
is drawn from the same population distribution of overcharges (i.e. no 
systematic tendency for specific methodologies to over- or under-estimate.  
Abstracting from systematic measurement errors30, if the null is rejected, this 
implies some systematic difference between methodologies in how they 
measure the counterfactual.  In common with others working in this area, C&B 
refer to the counterfactual as the „but for‟ price.  However, this is not without 
ambiguity: is the „but for‟ price the „competitive‟ price or the market price that 
would have obtained under a set of identical conditions (including market 
structure) except for the existence of the cartel?  Contrary to some discussion, 
the correct answer would appear to be the latter and this leaves open the 
possibility that a defendant might argue that damages should be only 
moderate because the „but for‟ should be the tacitly collusive price.   
To pursue this further, consider the relative magnitudes of the sample means 
in the Table.  For this purpose the „econometric‟ category is discarded 
because it includes a heterogeneous variety of implicit oligopoly models 
(counterfactuals) across papers.  But the remaining categories do lend 
themselves to the following speculative interpretation.  Suppose, merely for 
the sake of the argument, that the yardstick method typically identifies the 
„competitive‟ outcome as its counterfactual.  In that case, we know that on 
average cartels set a price 39% higher than the competitive level.  This then 
allows us to interpret the counterfactuals identified in the three other 
categories as follows: 
 during price wars the cartel price falls to 45% below the non-price-war 
cartel price, i.e. 6% (= 39-45) below the competitive level.  
 the price before cartel is typically 10% (=39-29) higher than the 
competitive level 
 the price after cartel is typically 16% higher than the competitive level  
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  Or that the researchers‟ choice of estimator is not independent of the actual cartel price 
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Taken at face value, this implies the following typical time path for price.  Even 
before the cartel episode, price starts from a supra-competitive level, then 
rises during the cartel period, before falling post-cartel.  However, the post-
cartel price remains at a supra-competitive level.  On the other hand, in the 
typical price war within the cartel period, price falls substantially below the 
competitive level (implying harsher punishment than Nash reversion. 
Leaving aside whether these sample means are statistically significantly 
different, these point estimates imply two conclusions: 
Of course, this is highly speculative - it is based on simplistic interpretation of 
sample point estimates without attention to statistical significance.  This is 
deliberate because of doubts about the quality of at least some of the 
estimates in Connor‟s database (Ehmer and Rosati (2009).  have re-worked 
this database to exclude all estimates not meeting a variety of selection 
criteria, and this leads to a drastic pruning in the sample.  Future work is 
anticipated which will investigate whether the estimates reported in Table 3 
OXERA (2009, p.90-92) are robust to such a pruning, and whether or not they 
differ significantly.   
In the meantime,, these exploratory results are of some interest for our  
understanding of typical cartel time paths.  Regarding post-cartel prices, 
Kovacic et al. (2007) report that “In analyzing prices in the post-plea period, 
which is a period of potential tacit collusion, we find that vitamin products with 
two conspirators continue as if the explicit conspiracy never stopped, while 
products with three or four conspirators return to pre-conspiracy pricing, or 
lower, quite quickly”. Sabbatini (2008, p.501) concludes his study of Italian 
milk cartels by noting that “Cartels don‟t break simply because you uncover 
them as they may continue as „well established‟ rules”.  This possibility, that 
shared understandings (tacit collusion) might often survive cartel busts is also 
implied by some of the results emerging from the experimental literature (e.g. 
Fonseca and Norman, 2010). Harrington (2004) raises a slightly different 
argument: the parties might moderate price reductions mindful of the signal 
that this would send to the courts regarding the magnitude of the previous 
overcharge.  Regarding pre-cartel price, Harrington (2006) points to various 
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instances where cartel formation is preceded by a significant price decline, 
and suggests that this might be accounted for by, variously, cost/demand 
shocks, entry and/or capacity expansion, and the breakdown of tacit collusion. 
However, as Harrington notes, this question has so far attracted little or no 
theoretical examination. 
5. Selection bias and deterrence 
5.1 Some potential sources of selection bias 
Inevitably, evaluation studies focus on documented cases in the public 
domain, and amongst these, usually the ones where an intervention has 
actually occurred or been seriously contemplated. As noted frequently in the 
literature, this raises a variety of doubts about whether such a sample  can 
provide an unbiased estimate of the benefits of competition policy.  It also 
leaves open the problematic issue of how to treat the deterrent effect.  This 
section draws together various strands in a fairly disparate existing literature 
on selection bias and deterrence into a coherent framework which highlights 
the most pressing questions for future research. 
We start by recalling two conclusions from section 2.6. 
(i) Different evaluation methodologies are less practicable for some types 
of markets and interventions (e.g. event studies for markets populated 
by unquoted or conglomerate firms.)  This relates to potential selection 
bias within the set of detected cases investigated by CAs. 
(ii) Some policy areas, notably Article 102, have been evaluated much 
less frequently than others.  This may reflect a low incidence of abuse 
in the population, but it also raises the possibility of selection bias due 
to lower detection rates, or reluctance by CAs to intervene.   
The previous literature contains numerous other instances of why evaluation 
is susceptible to selection bias problems; the following examples illustrate.   
(i) In the empirical literature on cartels (e.g. duration and overcharge) it is 
widely understood that the samples analysed may be intrinsically 
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biased because they are drawn exclusively from detected investigated 
cases, which may not be representative of the unknown population of 
undetected cases. 
(ii) When the rigour of merger policy is evaluated using a sample of 
unchallenged mergers, Carlton (2009) points to an easily overlooked 
bias.  He poses the question: „suppose we observe that the mean price 
increase in a sample of unchallenged mergers is negative, can we 
deduce that the CA is sufficiently (or even over-) strict?‟ The answer is 
no because, even with a lax CA (inclined to Type I errors), such a 
sample will include „good‟ mergers alongside any incorrectly permitted 
„bad‟ (price increasing) mergers.  He suggests that any such evaluation 
should more properly compare outcomes with the CA‟s predictions at 
the time of its decisions to estimate the systemic bias in enforcement. 
(iii) It is widely acknowledged that the beneficial deterrent effects of 
competition enforcement are likely to be considerable, probably far 
outweighing the measurable benefits of the actual caseloads of CAs.  It 
follows that any evaluation of the benefits of policy based only on 
investigated cases may be a serious underestimate, probably by an 
order of magnitude; however, we know remarkably little about the 
magnitudes of this global underestimate.   
The remainder of this section introduces a classification scheme designed to 
structure the various dimensions of potential selection bias and highlight 
directions for future research.   
5.2 How much of the iceberg lies below the waterline 
Figure 1 suggests a simple classification scheme to describe the full 
distribution of all potential competition cases in the population31.  In the event, 
some of these are deterred and never occur; amongst the undeterred cases, 
                                            
31
  This notion of a well-defined population of potential cases is not unproblematic, given 
that it is to include all deterred anti-competitive practices. Applying such a classification, 
analogously, to the law criminalising murder would require one to quantify the number of 
murders that would be committed were the practice not illegal. 
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some will be detected but some not; and then, within the detected set, some 
are investigated and some are not. 
This classification is used to illustrate some of the selection problems which 
would need to be resolved if one is to extrapolate from what we know (the 
investigated cases) to what we don‟t (the deterred, undetected and un-
investigated parts of the population.)  We proceed in two steps, considering 
first the relative sizes (frequencies of cases) of the classes, and then the 
potential heterogeneity between the classes (measured by, say, mean 
expected harm), which reflects any potential selection bias.    
 
Figure 1 A general classification of potential competition cases 
 
5.2.1 Relative frequencies 
Denoting the conditional probabilities by: deterrence rate (ω), detection rate 
(φ), and investigation rate (σ), it follows that the sample of investigated cases:  
Property 1: represents only a (perhaps very) small proportion, (1- ω)*(φ)*(σ), 
of the population of all potentially relevant cases.  
Property 2:  fails to capture any beneficial deterrent effect. 
Property 3: fails to capture the „missed opportunities‟ represented by harmful 
cases that are either wrongly un-investigated or undetected.32 
The first two are trivial, but the third is often overlooked in evaluation studies. 
                                            
32
 We abstract for the moment from possible offsetting effects, e.g. deterrence of welfare-
enhancing mergers, and incorrect Type II intervention decisions. 
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5.2.2 A back of envelope quantification 
It remains for future work to establish how rigorously these three properties 
might be quantified, but to illustrate how information already in the public 
domain might be employed, we draw on a rare qualitative study by Deloitte 
(2007), commissioned by the OFT.  This involved interviews/telephone 
surveys of lawyers, economists and companies.  The key findings (2007, pp. 
7-12) on deterrence are shown in Table 4.  From the survey of legal advisers, 
they suggest that, for each merger blocked or modified by the CA, there were 
at least another 5 proposed mergers, that were abandoned or modified on 
competition grounds.  There „multiplier‟ was slightly smaller for potential 
Article 102 cases, but higher for commercial agreements (Article 101).  
According to their survey of the companies themselves, the reported 
multipliers were all considerably higher. 
Table 4: Deterrence multipliers 
 Legal survey Company survey 
Mergers 5:1 – 
Cartels 5:1 16:1 
Commercial agreements 7:1 29:1 
Abuses 4:1 10:1 
Turning to undetected cases, Deloitte report that the number of 'under the 
radar' (i.e. undetected by the OFT) mergers was at least as high as the 
number which are blocked or modified following intervention by the UK 
competition authorities3334.  
                                            
33
  Strictly speaking the survey reports that the number of undetected problematic mergers 
was at least as high as the number of investigated ones, in which case the total detection rate 
may be much lower than 50%.  
34
  Another study, by the Dutch competition authority was designed to estimate the scope 
of merger deterrence (NMa - Research into the Anticipation of merger Control, October 27, 
2005 
http://www.nmanet.nl/Images/Rapport%20Research%20into%20the%20Anticipation%20of%2
0merger%20control_tcm16-86578.pdf). Law firms were asked to report ideas, initiatives, and 
notifications of mergers. The responses showed that around 58% of the ideas became an 
initiative, and around 68% of the initiatives progressed into a notification, implying a 60% 
upper bound for frequency-based deterrence. The report also reveals that according to the 
law firms‟ estimates, there is one case per year in each law firm where the merger does not 
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These estimates should be interpreted with considerable caution (see the 
qualifications stressed in the report itself), but taken at face value, and 
arbitrarily assuming a value of 0.5 for σ the investigation rate (in principle, this 
could be computed from the CA‟s own records), we can back out estimates of 
the probabilities as in Table 5, and then the population frequencies as in 
Table 6. 
Table 5: Deterrence and detection probabilities 
 ω35 φ 
Cartels 0.56 0.1736 
Mergers 0.56 0.5 
The three above properties can then be quantified as: (i) the investigated 
sample is only about 10% of the full population of potential mergers and less 
than 4% of potential cartels;37 (ii) there are five (fifteen) times as many 
deterred as investigated merger (cartels). On the other hand, (iii) there are 
three (ten) times as many „missed opportunities‟ (undetected or un-
investigated) as investigated mergers (cartels) cases. 
Table 6: Calculated frequencies for categories 
 Cartels Mergers 
Deterred 0.556 0.556 
Undetected 0.368 0.222 
Un-investigated 0.0377 0.111 
Investigated 0.0377 0.111 
                                                                                                                             
proceed exclusively for its anticipated anticompetitive effects (6% of the total number of 
cases), and around two cases per year (12%) where a merger proceeds in an amended form. 
These figures are to be treated with caution bearing in mind the small sample (only 15 firms), 
but they suggest a much lower deterrence ratio than the OFT study. 
35
  This uses the Deloitte finding of 5 deterred cases for each investigated case, ω = 5(1- 
ω)φσ, from which ω can be calculated using the estimations for φ, and the arbitrarily chosen 
0.5 for σ.  
36
  Based on Ormosi (2010a)discussed below. 
37
  Even if we assume that all known cases are investigated (i.e. σ = 1) these ratios will 
still only be 22% and 10% respectively. 
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Needless to say, these estimates are presented for merely illustrative 
purposes – they show the implications of the Deloitte study in particular, but 
we reserve judgement on whether or not they might be credible. 
5.2.3 Heterogeneity between case classes (selection bias) 
It should also be stressed that these calculations relate only to the 
frequencies of each class – they do not quantify the relative amounts of 
deterred harm or missed opportunities. This would only be true if the expected 
harm of cases in all categories were identical.  However, the possibility of 
selection bias raises suspicion that expected harm will differ systematically 
between the classes of case in fig. 1.  It is to this question that we now turn38. 
First, it is important to note that the distinction between categories is not clear 
cut, and that the frequencies and make-up of the classes are endogenous to 
the policy decisions of the CA.  Consider mergers as an example.  In 
jurisdictions where there is a compulsory pre-merger notification regime (most 
of the world) a regulatory threshold demarcates the cases that do not have to 
be notified. Above the threshold there are 3 types of case: (1) those where 
there is only a trivial preliminary screening, (2) phase I cases; (3) phase 2 
cases. Figure 2 positions these subsets on a line which represents increasing 
intensity of investigation. Although all cases above the threshold theoretically 
have to be investigated (i.e. the CA has no discretion), it is arguable whether 
a simplistic screening of the merger (or even a phase I review, as discussed 
below) should qualify as an investigation. So the question for mergers is: 
where to draw the line on Figure 2, below which we consider cases as un-
investigated.39 
 
                                            
38
  The OFT (2010c) p.22. speculates about applying a multiplier to account for the 
deterrent effect of its enforcement activity, where the value of the multiplier is derived from the 
Deloitte survey.  This method implicitly assumes that the distribution of case types in the 
investigated and deterred classes are similar.  
39
  In non-mandatory pre-merger notification regimes (such as the UK) the situation is 
different as the CA has more discretion whether to investigate mergers. 
40 
 
Figure 2 The level of the investigation (increasing from left to right) 
 
The possibility that CA discretion may have an important distortionary impact 
on evaluation is not confined to just mergers, and the choices made by the CA 
are an integral part of its policy and should therefore also form part of any 
evaluation.  The key idea here is that a CA is confronted with a set of potential 
cases where it could assemble sufficient information to undertake a full 
investigation (and subsequently possibly intervene) but, in the event, it 
chooses not to pursue them all.   
This possibility cannot be excluded as one possible explanation for the 
previously highlighted scarcity of evaluations of Article 102 cases - perhaps 
CAs choose to intervene less frequently in such cases because successful 
prosecution is more uncertain40. A related issue is highlighted in the cartel 
setting by Chang and Harrington (2010) who discuss how the CA‟s caseload 
can affect cartel births and deaths. They model the outcome of a cartel fine as 
the result of three events: (1) detection, (2) decision to investigate, and (3) 
successful investigation. They assume that detection is exogenous, but posit 
that the decision to investigate is a matter of CA choice, and success is 
negatively correlated with the CA‟s workload, that is, it is determined by (1) 
and (2).41  
Of course, given finite resources, coupled with a need to substantiate its 
impact, it is rational for any CA to pursue the „easy options‟; i.e. easier cases 
at the expense of more difficult cases (for which the probability of „success‟ is 
lower or where there is greater uncertainty.)  This may have serious 
                                            
40
  Alternatively, it may be that the CA is totally unaware because abuses of Article 102 
are simply less transparent. 
41
  If this is so, they show how the introduction of a leniency programme will lead the CA to 
pursue a less aggressive policy towards non-leniency cartels. 
 
Under threshold Trivial screening Phase I Phase II 
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implications for selection bias – both for policy in general and in specific parts 
(e.g. Article 102).  We believe that this issue merits further research. 
A related danger is highlighted by Neven and Zengler (2008), who suggest 
that the evaluation programme itself may introduce an additional motive for 
distortionary discretion in CA conduct: “Faced with simplistic assessment, 
authorities may be tempted to be overly interventionist, to spend too many 
resources and to ignore relevant information” (2008, p. 477.)  This returns us 
to the question of what is the purpose of evaluation, and who undertakes it.  If 
evaluation is driven by external accountability (to verify whether the CA 
delivers its objectives) and especially if undertaken by the CA itself, the CA is 
prone to fall into the trap identified by Chang and Harrington (2010), that it will 
not seek to maximise deterrence, but focus on something that is 
observable/measurable (e.g. the proportion of Art.102 cases that are won, or 
the number of cartels detected).  This can have very important feedback 
effects, not just for evaluation, but also for success in achieving the ultimate 
objectives of competition policy.  
5.2.4 Existing academic literature on detection and deterrence  
The task of calibrating the three parameters and quantifying likely magnitudes 
of associated selection biases is formidable.  In our opinion (Table 7) the 
investigation rate is potentially the easiest to estimate, and could be computed 
from the CA‟s own records.  But detection and especially deterrence are more 
problematic.  
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Table 6 The increasing difficulty of estimating the three probabilities 
 
The detection rate is not directly observable of course, but a body of emerging 
research offers some promise that indirect estimation may be possible using 
relatively atheoretical statistical methods.  This research also has implications 
for the rate of deterrence, but may involve additional theoretical modelling of 
the creation of mergers, cartels and other business practices. More work is 
clearly needed – for example, on whether observed CA activity and latent 
deterrence are complementary or substitutes42,  More generally, there may be 
fruitful avenues of research drawing on the wider legal deterrence literature.  
For instance, the critique by Donohue and Wolfers (2006) of the common 
mistakes made in the statistical analysis of the deterrent effect of the death 
penalty might be helpful.  Within the existing academic economics literature, a 
number of papers suggest potentially fruitful strands of future research on 
both cartels and mergers. 
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  This might be approached statistically by comparative analysis of high and low 
deterrence authorities. 
 Probabilities of 
interest 
Source of data Literature examples 
Observed Investigation rate CA’s records – 
Unobserved Detection rate 
Atheoretical 
empirical methods 
Bryant and Eckard (1991) 
Combe et at. (2008) 
Ormosi (2010) 
Theory-based 
empirical methods 
Miller (2009) 
Harrington et al. (2009) 
Cheng et al. (2010) 
Surveys 
OFT (2007) 
Beckstein and Landis-
Gabel (1982) 
Unobserved Deterrence rate 
CA’s records 
Aaronson (1992)  
Baros et al. (2010) 
Clougherty et al. (2009) 
Theory-based 
empirical methods 
Harrington et al. (2009) 
Cheng et al. (2010) 
Surveys NMa (2005) 
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5.2.4.1 Cartels 
A commonly cited statistic, originating from the early work of Bryant and 
Eckard (1991) is that, in a given year, 13-17%  of cartels are detected.  More 
recently for Europe, Combe et al. (2008) confirm a similar result.  However, 
this statistic should not be confused with what we refer to here as the 
detection rate: these estimates were of conditional probabilities – conditional 
on the cartel eventually being detected. A discussion paper by Ormosi 
(2010a) proposes a different method (a capture-recapture analysis) to 
estimate the detection rate, which does not require the assumption that 
detected cartels have to be a random sample of all cartels. This method 
allows the analysis of the detection rate over time, and suggests that the 
European Commission‟s detection rate has improved to 15-20% in the most 
recent years.  However, this still leaves open the question of how many 
cartels are never detected and how many are deterred.  
Four recent articles address this question by modelling the unobserved 
process of cartel formation and breakdown, in order to draw inferences about 
the deterrent effect of enforcement. Harrington and Chang (2009) (hereafter 
H&C) and Chang and Harrington (2010) (hereafter C&H) use similar 
approaches to establish the relationship between what we can observe 
(detected cartels) and what is hidden. H&C set up a system for cartel 
formation and death and identify the links between changes in this system 
and a change in observable factors such as the number of detected cartels. 
They argue that observing the number of discovered cartels can only permit 
ambiguous speculations about the effect of enforcement43, and that the 
duration of cartels is a better indicator of the effect of a policy change. This is 
because a more stringent enforcement policy will result in a set of detected 
cartels which have longer duration because unstable, and therefore shorter, 
cartels are now no longer formed in the first place. However, although 
duration of detected cartels is easily observed, we still face the familiar 
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  The rate of cartel formation and detection both decrease with the size of penalties, but 
changing the effectiveness of enforcement (e.g. the introduction of a leniency programme) 
has an ambiguous effect. 
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problem, that the set of detected cartels is most likely not a random 
subsample of all cartels.  
In C&H, the model is changed to allow for the introduction of a leniency 
programme, which affects not only the probability of detection in cases where 
one of the firms comes forward, but also the probability of discovery for other 
cartels as well.44 They find that leniency has a deterrent effect because it 
reduces the cartel rate and also improves the CA's probability of winning non-
leniency cases.45 
C&H also develop the model to incorporate the amount of resources available 
to the CA, which is a primary determinant of the success of its cartel 
enforcement. This affects the rate of cartel formation because it changes the 
probability that firms assign to being caught, investigated, and convicted.  This 
in turn determines the number of cases handled by the CA and thus the 
probability that they can get a conviction. 
As mentioned earlier, an interesting assumption in C&H is that the CA does 
not seek to minimise the cartel discovery rate because it is not observable, 
much less verifiable. Rather, it strives to maximise the number of cases won. 
This would mean that enhanced deterrence is not in the interest of the CA if 
that were to reduce its caseload – and consequently the number of cases 
won.  Although this might seem a questionable assumption, there is some 
intuition to support it: deterrence is difficult to measure and therefore include 
in any performance measure of the CA. If the CA's budget is based on 
previous years' performance, which excludes deterrence, then the assumption 
becomes more plausible.  However, a less plausible assumption in C&H is 
that the CA has a discretion which cartels to investigate. In reality, it seems 
unlikely that the CA is in the position to turn down cartel cases, although it is 
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  Other literature (such as Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) and Bigoni et al (2008)) had 
assumed that enforcement through non-leniency means is unaffected by the introduction of 
leniency measures. 
45
  The paper also shows that an increasing cartel rate is now possible for the set of 
industries where cartels are more stable. As the introduction of leniency programmes 
weakens enforcement for non-leniency cases, industries with more stable cartels will be 
characterised by increasing cartel rates. 
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likely that „too many‟ cartel investigations might seriously constrain the 
resources it is able to devote to individual cases. Another problem is that, if 
non-leniency cases are more likely to remain un-investigated, this might 
distort firms‟ incentives to come forward.  
Miller (2009) empirical work, which assumes a first-order Markov process in 
the expected number of colluding or competing industries in the next period,  
also attempts to measure the impact of the introduction of a leniency 
programme.  He uses a database of indictments and information reports filed 
in the US between 1985 and 2005. His results show that the total number of 
cartel discoveries increased around the time of the introduction of the leniency 
programme but then fell back below pre-leniency levels. He argues that this is 
consistent with enhanced cartel detection and deterrence. However, following 
C&H, this could also simply imply that, with leniency in place, the CA expends 
much less effort in discovering non-leniency cartels, and this will reduce the 
number of challenged cartels in the long run.  
Hyytinen et al. (2010) use a variation of the models proposed by H&C and 
C&H to exploit the characteristics of a Hidden Markov model which links 
observed and unobserved processes. Their database is for cartels in Finland 
between 1951 and 1990, an era when cartels had to be registered but 
typically were not illegal. The fact that cartels were legal means that the 
authors only use two dimensions of their proposed model (as regulatory 
discovery and leniency applications are not applicable).  There are two 
restrictive shortcomings of their model: (1) it only allows leniency applications 
to occur when a cartel is unstable; (2) the detection probability only shows up 
in states where the industry was cartelising at the beginning of the same 
period.  
An important limitation of all four models is that markets are assumed to be 
dichotomously either cartelised or competing.  This therefore abstracts from 
the possibility that a  cartelised industry might switch to tacit collusion, or vice 
versa.  
Further work in this area should be fruitful. One way of proceeding may be 
along the lines of Ormosi (2010a) recent working paper. The key idea of this 
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paper is to employ a multiple sampling method, similar to those used in 
ecology to estimate population parameters. This provides estimates of 
population characteristics (such as survival or detection rate) over time. The 
change in these time dependent estimates could be used, together with the 
change in the number of detected cases, to deduce how the deterrence rate 
changes over time, but this part of that paper is still work in progress. 
5.2.4.2 Mergers 
The deterrent effect of merger policies is slightly more complicated because it 
impacts  not only on the number of foregone mergers, but also on the design 
of the mergers (i.e. had there been a less stringent policy in place, a different 
merger would have been proposed). Recognising  this, Aaronson (1992) 
distinguishes frequency-based and composition-based deterrent effects.  On 
the other hand, estimating the deterrent effect of merger policies should be 
relatively easier than for cartels because typically fewer mergers go 
undetected, and the observed change in the number of notified mergers 
should be informative about the deterrent effects of a given regulatory change 
or intervention.46 This is confirmed by Barros et al. (2010), who find that the 
number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more 
appropriate indicator of the effects of underlying changes in merger policy 
than the relative anti-competitiveness of proposals (composition-based 
deterrence). Seldeslachts et al. (2009) use the frequency of mergers in their 
method for explaining merger waves, and then deterrence, as a departure 
from a wave. They use a longitudinal model where current mergers are 
explained in terms of various (lagged) CA actions and lagged merger 
notifications. Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2009) look at US merger 
deterrence using a similar method. They examine composition based and 
frequency based deterrence. Their model distinguishes between the start of 
investigations, the challenging of a merger, and the prohibition of mergers. 
They find that instigating an investigation and challenging a merger have  
significant deterrent effects, whereas prohibition does not. 
                                            
46
  Except in regimes where there is no pre-merger notification such as in the UK. 
47 
 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that over-stringent policy can sometimes 
deter welfare enhancing practices or proposals.  This would include mergers 
which might lead to strong efficiency effects; vertical practices (perhaps RPM) 
where the beneficial efficiency gains outweigh any anti-competitive 
foreclosure effect; or even cases where firms may refrain from fierce price 
competition because they are deterred by predatory pricing policy.  This is 
rarely even discussed in CA evaluations, although admittedly quantification 
would be difficult. An interesting example is given by Eckbo (1992), who finds 
no evidence of Canadian mergers having anticompetitive effects. If so, it 
follows that any deterred merger must  be either a welfare loss, or at least no 
gain. 
6. Conclusions and future research priorities 
This paper surveys the existing literature on the evaluation of competition 
policy and identifies some of the most pressing undeveloped areas and 
unanswered questions for priority in future research.   
The first part of the paper focuses on the most popular quantitative evaluation 
methodologies, and draws five main conclusions: 
1. Simulation, event studies and difference-in-differences are each useful 
weapons in the evaluation armoury, but they each seem less suited for 
certain types of markets and interventions than for others.  It follows that 
any evaluation study based on a sample of cases, using only one 
methodology faces a likely problem of selection bias in the make-up of 
that sample. 
2. There has been far less evaluation of Article 102 cases than of merger 
and cartel cases.  Possible explanations include (i) limitations of the 
existing methodologies, (ii) greater difficulty in detection (iii) greater 
deterrence of existing policy, (iv) greater caution by CAs in prosecuting 
Article 102 cases.  Further research on these alternative explanations is a 
high priority. 
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3. Most evaluation studies have been applied over only short-term time 
periods.  This is partly due to the nature of the methodologies themselves.  
In any event, it fails to recognise that (i) the effects of a particular policy 
intervention may not always be exhausted within one or two years, and (ii) 
intervention in one (e.g. merger) case may well affect the probabilities that 
subsequent events (mergers) will occur.  More longer term studies would 
help fill an important gap in the literature.   
4. Any policy evaluation necessarily requires an assumed counterfactual.  
Likewise, when choosing a particular evaluation methodology for a 
particular case, in effect, one may be choosing between different implicit 
counterfactuals. It follows that, where data limitations constrain which 
methodology is applied, or how it is applied, this will also constrain the 
choice of counterfactual.  This deserves more recognition in the literature.   
5. There are few comparative studies applying alternative methodologies 
to the same sample of cases, to identify whether there are systematic 
differences between methodologies in the quantification of impact.  This 
paper explores one potential route for undertaking such a comparative 
analysis.  It draws on an existing meta-sample of cartels, for which 
overcharge has been estimated using a variety of methodologies.  
Preliminary analysis suggests that there may be systematic differences 
which may be explicable in terms of systematic differences between the 
methodologies in their implicit counterfactuals. Work on this is ongoing, 
and the results may be of relevance, not only for evaluation per se, but 
also in understanding the typical time path of price before, during and after 
cartel episodes, and estimating damages. 
The second part of the paper turns to arguably the most daunting problem 
faced by the evaluation project: how to extrapolate from the cases we know 
about to those we don‟t?  This is crucial in order to draw any conclusions on 
the aggregate benefits of competition and competition policy.  At this stage we 
draw four conclusions. 
6. The set of investigated cases probably constitutes only a small sample of 
the population of all potential cases with competition implications.  First, a 
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major impact of policy is the deterrence of anti-competitive 
practices/mergers which would have occurred absent competition policy. 
This is already widely recognised, but rarely quantified.  On the other 
hand, what is sometimes overlooked is that CAs inevitably fail to detect 
some anti-competitive cases and wrongly fail to investigate some others of 
which they are aware. Where this occurs, there is a lost opportunity to 
secure welfare enhancement by the CA, and in that sense a „cost‟.  Both 
success in deterrence and lost opportunities should be included in any 
aggregate assessment of competition policy.   
7. Further research is clearly required if the extent of deterrence and 
detection are to be better understood and quantified.  There are two 
dimensions to this: assessing (i) the frequency with which deterrence and 
detection occur and (ii) the expected magnitudes of harm entailed in 
deterred and undetected cases, relative to investigated cases.  
8. Attempts to quantify both dimensions are still at a very preliminary stage, 
especially on the latter – precisely because of the problem of selection 
bias, which occurs whenever the characteristics of a selected sample 
(observed investigated cases) may differ systematically from cases that 
are excluded from the sample.  For example, it is insufficient to know 
merely how many cartels go undetected, we also need to know whether 
they are systematically more or less harmful than those cartels which are 
detected and prosecuted.   
9. There is an emerging academic literature which, in our opinion, currently 
offers the most promising prospects for improving an understanding of 
both detection and deterrence.  Given further development, this should 
help improve how we tackle both problems of selection bias and how we 
attempt to quantify the full benefits of competition policy. 
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